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BODILY SCHEMATA AND SARTRE’S I AND ME: 
REFLECTION AND AWARENESS IN MOVEMENT 
JODIE MCNEILLY MONASH UNIVERSITY 
As a dancer, I have been involved in many different investigations of the moving body to 
understand what it is capable of in terms of unlimited, non-exhaustive expression. These 
investigations have taken place in a range of movement practices that train the body in dance 
technique and performance. Some of these practices suggest that a dancer gains special access to 
an awareness of the felt moving body as a spontaneous, pre-reflective source of bodily 
constitution, thus claiming experiences of embodied consciousness. For example, in authentic 
movement the dancer will move spontaneously from impulse. Planned movements or the decision 
to move from felt sensations are resisted to enable spontaneity.1 In the practice of BodyMind 
Centering (BMC), a body of bones, skin, muscles, tissue, organs, fluids, glands and cells are sensed 
through an imagined attention directed towards these integrated systems. 2  Exercises are 
developed to sensuously perceive their shape, weight, relations, texture and motility in order to 
effect action and increase awareness of these internal mechanisations generally hidden to us in 
everyday experience. These examples share a commitment to obtaining a very specific awareness 
of the body and its source of constitution. Practitioner methods differ, as do their claims for how 
access is possible. In this paper, I argue that reflection is integral to an awareness of the body and 
its senses, and so question certain dance practices that claim access to a realm of pre-reflective, 
non-intentional movement.3 My questioning suggests a problematic philosophical slippage from 
active reflection to a more suspicious realm of pre-reflection that ultimately compromises the aims 
of most somatic approaches that emphasise “attention”, “deep awareness” (Eddy 2009) and the 
opportunity for those engaging in these practices “to reenter and experience their bodies more 
fully through movement” (Stromsted 2007, 201).    
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One such philosopher to problematise self-awareness and the relationship between body and 
consciousness was Jean-Paul Sartre in his essay of 1937, The Transcendence of The Ego: An 
existentialist theory of consciousness. Here he argues that self-knowing or awareness is impossible 
without some form of reflection that is constituted beyond consciousness itself. Consciousness 
only ‘is’ insofar as it intends objects in the world; it is both pure intentionality and wholly 
transcendent.  
Sartre’s re-structuring of consciousness in relation to the constitution of the ego is first seen in his 
model of reflection, and second, as a movement of transcendence within intentional 
consciousness. In the first part of this article, I will consider Sartre’s model of reflection in relation 
to his thoughts on the body’s relationship to consciousness in The Transcendence of the Ego, and 
draw upon the ontological distinctions of the body he makes in Being and Nothingness: An Essay on 
Phenomenological Ontology (1943). From this, I will develop Sartre’s thesis of transcendence and 
model of reflection, suggesting that the so-called ‘hidden’ organising structures of the body, 
understood in embodied cognition as bodily-schemata (the kinaesthesias/proprioception), can be 
accounted for if our attention is not directed inward toward the body, but turned toward external 
sites of interaction where bodies are extended through clothing, costume and/or digital 
technologies. Just as Sartre’s theory of object transcendence attempts to go beyond the vagueness 
of an ego-oriented interior, the role of object transcendence in dance practices for accessing the 
deeper structures (‘depth structure’) of bodily movement reverses our attention from an internal 
focus to an external one. This perspective does more than just critically rehabilitate historical dance 
forms like ballet and modern in response to British New Dance that resisted these mirror-led 
practices by internalising the dancer’s experience, it highlights how this ‘second reversal’ from an 
internal to an external focus on the body can be useful in contemporary forms of dance making 
that involve digital technologies supraextending the moving body.4                
1 Sartre’s model of reflection  
1.1 Unreflected Consciousness and Ego 
There are two levels in Sartre’s model of reflection for consciousness, the unreflected and the 
reflected. Unreflected consciousness reflects upon reflected consciousness that intends—in the 
traditional sense of intentionality: having consciousness about something—its own objects of 
perception: that chair, that thought, etc., but it cannot be reflected upon itself, nor easily intuited. 
For Sartre, unreflected consciousness does not possess an Ego.5 “The I is the Ego as the unity of its 
actions [while] the me is the Ego as the unity of states and qualities” (Sartre [1937] 2004, 30). As a 
unity of actions, states and qualities that occur in the world, the Ego on Sartre’s account is never a 
unifying, or structuring agent of consciousness. Concerning ourselves only with actions and states 
in the following discussion, all physical actions like “playing the piano”, “driving a car”, and “writing” 
are all transcendent objects as they are actions “taken from the world of things”. Mental actions 
like “doubting, reasoning, meditating, and making a hypothesis” are also about things in the world, 
and are therefore transcendent (Sartre [1937] 2004, 33). When it comes to states, take for example 
the statement, ‘I hate Peter’, the state of hatred is a transcendent object of a concrete intuition (just 
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as much as Peter the person is) and can be apprehended on reflection; “it is present to the gaze of 
reflective consciousness, it is real” (Sartre [1937] 2004, 30). The Ego in whichever unity is the object 
of consciousness found “in the world” outside of us, rather than as some internal part lurking in, 
above, or behind consciousness; “it is a being in the world, like the ego of another” (Sartre [1937] 
2004, 19). 
Sartre’s conception of the Ego is epistemically and ontologically different to the way in which 
Immanuel Kant is understood to have taken up consciousness in his formulation of the self as a 
conceptual ‘I think’: 
The I think must be able to accompany all my representations; for otherwise 
something would be represented in me that could not be thought at all, which is as 
much to say that the representation would either be impossible or else at least 
would be nothing for me (Kant [1781] 1998, Pt. II. Div. I. Bk. I. Ch. II. §16, 246).  
For Sartre, the Kantian ‘I think’ does not in reality accompany all our representations (perceptions 
and thoughts). He argues that Kant speaks only of the possibility that “I should always be able to 
consider my perception or my thought as mine” (Sartre [1937] 2004, 19); and that we should not 
understand it is an existential given, or “real entity” (Sartre [1937] 2004, 20).  
Sartre’s conception of the Ego is also a renunciation of Husserl’s positing of a “pure ego” 
transcendentally attained through his famous phenomenological device, the epoché. The epoché 
was central to Husserl’s project to establish phenomenology as a foundational descriptive science. 
His method of reduction was employed to establish the ontological and universal structural 
conditions for an irreducible ego, cleared of all those debilitating transcendencies (including the 
psychical and psycho-physical aspects of “me”) by “parenthesiz[ing] everything which that positing 
[within an everyday, natural attitude] encompasses with respect to being” (Husserl [1913] 1998, 
61). For Sartre, the result of this reductive maneuver is where Husserl goes wrong: aiming at an 
Ego now reduced to something non-empirical that trails behind, or hovers above consciousness. 
The ego, now, is an abstract version encumbered by an impersonal “I” attempting to unite all the 
instances of temporal consciousness. In practising phenomenology, Sartre sees no reason to go 
beyond intentionality: having consciousness about something, even when this something is 
consciousness itself.  
If we consider claims to pre-reflective awareness in terms of Sartre’s model of reflection and his 
concept of the Ego, what can be understood from an analysis of the body in somatic dance 
practices? But firstly, for Sartre, unreflected consciousness does not possess an Ego as reflected 
consciousness does. This entails that there can be no “I” in relation to a psycho-physical me as 
unities of states and actions that constitute experience in this unreflected mode. Furthermore, if 
we accept Sartre’s criticisms of Kant’s and Husserl’s foundational ideas about the self and ego that 
arguably contribute to thoughts on self-awareness, no other version of the ego (if guided by a 
conceptual ‘I think’, or a ‘pure ego’) could promote an awareness constituting personal experiences, 
such as this is ‘my sensation’, ‘my movement’, ‘my body’. And even if we considered that unreflected 
consciousness did possess an Ego (in the Sartrean sense), this Ego would still need to exist outside 
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of consciousness in the world, like other egos and objects. By and large, Kant’s, Husserl’s and 
Sartre’s differing accounts of the ego bring no facility for self-awareness to an unreflected 
consciousness, nor arguably any other mode of consciousness that claims itself to not be subject 
to reflection. The questions now at hand are: how does the body relate to the Ego if it is 
unreflected? How can we have any kind of self-awareness of the deeper structures of the body if it 
cannot be reflected upon via an Ego?      
1.2 Egos, Body and Reflection  
For Sartre, a body can only be understood causally in relation to the Ego’s unity of states and actions 
that occur in the world. Sartre’s examples of “playing the piano”, “driving the car”, and “writing” are 
instances of “concerted” actions by a psycho-physical me (Sartre [1937] 2004, 33). But it is with 
some concern that we find no depth to the body in Sartre’s reflection upon these physical activities. 
Rather, attention towards the piano keys, the music produced, or the resultant words on a page 
bury the felt or imagined body in his totalising analyses. The body’s posture, finger strokes, 
steering, head turning, and gripping are withdrawn from the many available modes of reflected 
awareness. This is a consequence of the psycho-physical me’s fugitive nature as Sartre develops it 
in The Transcendence of the Ego. 
The psycho-physical me is unknown to us outside of the transcendent unities of states and actions 
in the world—actions that are infinite and contingent activities of the Ego. If we want to know this 
me, we need to take a step back for vantage, but as we do that “the me accompanies us in this 
withdrawal” (Sartre [1937] 2004, 86). For Sartre, the body also steps back in any attempt to acquire 
a vantage point. It is a fugitive from being known outside of its transcendent activities. The only 
account we can make of ourselves is a reconstitution of fragmented facts from those other than 
me; others provide us with knowledge of our body in its constitution. 
Presupposing that we are in a direct relationship with the world as objects, Sartre makes an 
ontological distinction between two modes of bodily Being in his later text of 1943 Being and 
Nothingness. The first mode is the body being nothing other than for-itself. In its nihilating escape 
from being (the in-itself) the for-itself demands a body in order to engage with the world. But for 
Sartre, the body being for-itself is “never a given which [we] can know” (Sartre [1943] 1958, 309). In 
contrast, the second mode—a body being-for-others—is the way our body is described to us by 
others: how it becomes known through others and “how it is placed in the perspective of the Other-
as-object” (Sartre [1943] 1958: 305). These two modes are important for understanding how 
somatic dance practitioners wanting epistemic certitude of their embodied selves through 
movement will need to take their body as an object.  For now, I will focus upon this second mode 
to further develop Sartre’s model of reflection in relation to his thesis of object transcendence and 
to insist upon an approach that requires an external attention to the body, rather than an internal 
one.  
In discussing a body being-for-others, we might take the example of the somatic practice of 
BodyMind Centering: a system developed by American Occupational therapist Bonnie Bainbridge-
Cohen in the 1970s. In BMC, the body is experienced from within, while consciousness and body 
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are inextricably experienced as an embodied whole. A somatic practice is broadly defined as 
“paying attention to bodily sensations emerging from within” and involves moving “slowly and 
gently in order to gain deeper awareness of the ‘self that moves’” (Eddy 2009, 6). BMC claims that 
we can learn something about the self through movement and the exploration of our embodiment.  
One model for describing first-person authority of our inner intentions is what philosopher, David 
Finkelstein calls detectivism. Detectivism is a way in which we can speak about our own thoughts, 
feelings and intentions. On this account, “consciousness is understood as involving a kind of inward 
observation or perception” (Finkelstein 2003, 5). Detectivism may be attributed to somatic practices 
that attempt to interrogate embodied consciousness through inward perception. For instance, 
BMC practitioners claim that: 
[w]hen we are talking about blood or lymph or any physical substances, we are not 
talking about substances but about states of consciousness and processes 
inherent within them. (Bainbridge-Cohen 2008, 3) 
But how do we know this? How do we know that a somatic experience of body can be united with 
consciousness; that it can affirm consciousness and provide special access to our bodily experience 
through inward perception? 
In practising BMC, I have hissed into a single kidney with a concentrated breath for more than six 
hours at a time, and imagined moving from the nucleus of my own cell structure in tiny dances of 
the mitochondria. I have never seen my kidney, ascertained its precise location, or experienced 
kidney pain. During this exercise, I vaguely located the region of kidney through mental imaging. 
These images were formed from illustrations and photographs from an anatomy book, and feeling 
the shape of a one-to-one scale plastic model. Imaging was helpful in undertaking an exercise 
where my breath was to move my organs. In terms of constituting my body, I was immediately 
aware of the inhalation and exhalation of breath at a sensory level: the rising and falling of the 
chest, and circulation through nose and mouth, but the point of the exercise was to become aware 
of an internal organ not normally felt, an organ otherwise engaged in involuntary processes and 
movements. In this exercise, I was required to constitute my body reflectively and imaginatively as 
a being-for-others. As Sartre points out in Being and Nothingness: 
I [too] was apprehending a wholly constituted object as a this among other thises, 
and it was only by a reasoning process that I referred it back to being mine; it was 
much more my property than my being. (Sartre [1943] 1958, 304) 
By and large, I would argue, BMC somatic techniques are examples of hyper-reflection and 
awareness constituted through a body being-for-others. For example, as I sit in this chair, I feel the 
bony edge of my sis bone connecting with the edge of my heel along a strong line of sensation; I 
can only describe this anatomically. In another example, I can imagine a plumb line that carves my 
body into two symmetrical halves, while at the same time ignoring an observable dissymmetry 
shown in a mirror, where one hip protrudes slightly more, and is a little higher than the other. In 
both cases, the body is constituted from sensation aided by an objective knowledge of anatomy. 
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Such felt imagining makes available a sensorial palette for designing and controlling bodily 
expression. For example, I can create a dialogue between the left and right half of my torso, 
becoming aware of this division by sensing that area of my body imaginatively constituted by a 
rudimentary knowledge of anatomy, but also sensorially from the ongoing experience of 
breathing, and the memory of pain from cracking a rib at age 14. From this, I might impose qualities 
of movement (sharp staccato, smooth snake-like undulations, volumetric suspensions) or even 
imagine one side of the torso containing angry bees flying in all directions, while the other side 
ripples like a pond disturbed by a thrown stone. Here, I constitute the body as being-for-others, and 
in the butoh-esque example where the body moves in relation to two conflicting images, it is a 
body being-other-things.6 I come to awareness as a mode of reflection through imagination. But, 
the question of how a body can be “wholly body and wholly consciousness” in these experiential 
examples, without being a body-for-others, becomes untenable (Sartre [1943] 1958).  
For Sartre, the first mode of bodily being, the body being-for-itself is just that, “wholly body and 
wholly consciousness”, but never united with a constituted body. The for-itself mode of being is an 
unperceived centre guiding our orientations with the world of objects. But in our attempt to unite 
the body with consciousness through reflection, we constitute a body being-for-others. As an 
ontological necessity, we are beings-in-the world; this is the in-itself claim of existence. Our most 
primary relation to this existence is the body being-for-itself in its thereness; it is the “unutilizable” 
centre. We find this in Husserl, and later in Merleau-Ponty, where they speak of the body as a zero 
point of orientation (Husserl [1928] 1989, §18, 61; Merleau-Ponty [1962] 2002, 105). But if, as 
Constance Mui asks, “the body is flesh/substantial/an opaque thing, how could consciousness be 
embodied and still remain translucent?” (Mui 2010, 90). How is it possible to relate a material body 
to nonpositional consciousness? Sartre insists that the body-for-itself, in its ‘I am my body and I 
exist’, needs to be forgotten, backgrounded, ignored and unreflected. It becomes a fugitive from 
our knowing. Ultimately, as Katherine Morris highlights, the body’s “duty is to ignore itself” in 
Sartre’s formulation (Morris 2010, 89). Despite the fact that a body being-for-itself is “our primary 
relation to the in-itself: our being in the world”, Sartre still deems it impossible to have an 
awareness of the body from this ontological mode (Sartre [1943] 1958, 306). He insists that the in-
itself and for-itself are “on different and incommunicable levels of being” (Sartre [1943] 1958, 305).  
Let us now consider some possible challenges to a body being-for-others in awareness through two 
cases of spontaneous movement, one from an everyday example and the other from authentic 
movement practice. In an everyday case of non-intended bodily movements and affects that erupt 
spontaneously, we may unexpectedly burst into laughter, burp, blush, dribble, itch, double over in 
pain, cough, sneeze, yawn, twitch, shiver, and sweat. If spontaneous bodily events, taken in 
isolation, are not intentional acts in and by themselves, how is awareness possible if not operative 
as a reflective act? If these bodily events endure beyond a single involuntary eruption, we can 
reflect upon them temporally in terms of a body being-for-others. If caused by some intentional 
activity, they are embedded within what Merleau-Ponty terms a “network of intentionalities” that 
can be reflected upon as a synthetic unity: we laugh at the joke; we choke from water caught in the 
wind-pipe while drinking; and we itch a spot from the mosquito that annoyingly disappears when 
we turn the light on (Merleau-Ponty [1962] 2002, 484). A possible way of understanding these 
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bodily events with Sartre’s model of reflection is to describe this border between the reflected and 
unreflected as a porous threshold of spontaneity. At this border, the sudden eruption of involuntary 
bodily movements and affects are constituted as my cough, blush or twitch through an immediate, 
marginal or hyper-reflective awareness.  
Extending this analysis to dance practices of spontaneous movement as a second case, we can 
inquire into the scope of potential awareness of our moving bodies. Authentic movement, for 
example, involves the mover actively engaged in the bracketing of concerted action so that his/her 
body is in a free state to move spontaneously, the bracketing must persist in order to be authentic. 
The mover is always actively resisting his/her control and planning of movements, while exerting a 
more overarching form of control: one is not to think of moving, while all one thinks about, or waits 
for, is movement. Furthermore, any moment of spontaneity that spikes through the threshold is 
experienced as an immediate awareness transitioning into reflection accompanied by an 
overarching meta-reflection that operates to resist planned movement: for a sudden flick of the 
wrist can move into a historically prescribed pathway of movement that this form wants to 
overcome. In general, I would suggest, authentic movement is a practice of meta-reflection that 
observes bodily movement erupting from a threshold of spontaneity. As a practice of meta-
reflective vigilance, this threshold is repeatedly returned to in order to stymie the development of 
conscious movement patterns. As challenges to a body being-for-others, the spontaneity of 
movement—whether as an eruption of some unexpected bodily event, or movement that 
“emerges from the depths of the unconscious and manifests in conscious awareness”—do not 
escape hyper-vigilant conscious reflections at any point in the event or practice (Tantia 2012, 57). 
This is more so in the case of authentic movement, which engages our thinking in a “rational”, 
“orderly” and “manageable” way—the very modes of mind that founder of the movement Mary 
Whitehouse implored the practice to “disregard” (1999, 44). In an authentic mover’s “moving to be 
moved”, they work with such conscious rigour to actively shut “out external visual stimuli” to attain 
a “deep sensing experience, which has the ability to reach into the very tissues of the body [to] 
evoke imagery, emotion, body sensation, memory and dreams” (Stromsted and Haze 2007, 58). All 
this work seems to affirm what we objectively know about the body as given, rather than hidden, 
and to “evoke” fictions that are conducive to creative dance practice, but not necessarily providing 
clearer insights into the ‘self’, or increasing access to an enigmatic consciousness as practitioners 
of the form seek.7      
Moreover, the term embodied consciousness, and like terms, are bandied about with special weight 
in somatic discourse and practice, as if they follow radically different procedures of access to the 
anatomically, objectified body that a body being-for-others describes (Shusterman 1998; see 
commentary on somatic practices in Sellars-Young 2013, 75-90). In constituting our bodies through 
a model of reflective awareness that has a dynamic depth, I am not convinced that somatic 
practitioners need to delve beyond reflection to find some pre-reflective, self-originating source 
unknown to us. Rather, they should focus their attentions upon the body as it is externally 
constituted, given readily to reflection. Ironically, this idea resonates with one of Bonnie Bainbridge 
Cohen’s opening remarks found in her seminal text on BMC practice: “The mind is like the wind 
and the body like the sand; if you want to know how the wind is blowing, you can look at the sand” 
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(2008, 1). BMC does not, however, stay primarily focused on the sand, but in fact looks more to the 
wind, and the source of that wind in an eagerness to delve into the internal depths of feeling and 
sensing that are beyond the tracks in the sand. My concern echoes Sartre’s questioning of Husserl’s 
investigations of consciousness and the needless positing of a transcendental ego that stands 
above or behind a psycho-physical me: Why is this me not enough? Is it not adequate to accept the 
ego-body as a reflected transcendent object, rather than reducing it to some unreflected mode of 
embodied consciousness (Sartre [1937] 2004, 21)? 
The fear of objectifying the body in experiential dance practices is rife (Whitehouse [1958] 1999). 
The lived body (Leib) is accepted as a subjectivating method for inward and internal awareness and 
so entails adopting a certain viewpoint from behind, within or above consciousness.8 However, I 
would argue that the overt subjectivisation of bodily awareness as a precious space for superior 
somatic access is highly problematic in its vagueness, while to accept an awareness of the body as 
a process of Sartrean transcendence is to engage modes of reflection that mitigate the problems 
of forcing an imagined unity between body and consciousness. This latter view implies two things, 
(1) it deals only with bodily constitution at the level of the reflective ego, and (2) it asserts external 
perception—even third person based perception as description—over the more complex and 
mysterious accounts of internal perception found within psychology, cognitive science and 
philosophy of mind.9 And yet, reflection must be seen in terms of the body’s ‘depth structure’ 
(bodily schemata), otherwise we fall short of providing a more distinctive account of the body, as 
Sartre appears to in his earlier writings. 
Existence aside, Sartre expresses little motivation for thematising the body. His analysis—for the 
most part—finds the body in retreat from reflected consciousness, and his investigation is 
presupposed by an attitude of unastonishment about the body. So what can Sartre’s thesis of 
transcendence contribute to those who are astonished by the body? 
2 Bodily schemata as depth structure 
For those who are astonished by the body, there is a need to bring into relief the deeper organising 
structures of the moving body, rather than allowing it to withdraw. In the creative arts, whether it 
is in designing movement on bodies for performance, studying their interaction with digital 
technologies, teaching dance, or writing about dance, such an attendance potentialises more 
choice in design and richer descriptive accounts in reviewing. Bodily-schemata are the deeper 
organising structures of the moving body, the kinaesthesias or proprioceptive system that form 
the basis of muscle contraction and our posture as we move within intentional actions. They are 
our bodily capabilities framing our more explicit sensations, and provide us with the possibility for 
movement (Sheets-Johnstone 2010, 2011; Gallagher 2005; Welton 2004). 
The consensus amongst phenomenologists and advocates of ‘embodied cognition’ attempting to 
account for bodily-schemata is that we can have no conscious, reflective awareness of these 
enigmatic body maps to movement. Such an account does not deny that something more 
fundamental structures and organises our conscious movement, but these bodily-schemata are 
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considered inaccessible in their connectedness to our preconscious being-in-the-world (Welton 
2004), or remain unknowable as prenoetic performances of the body (Gallagher 2005).10 Bodily-
schemata present a limit to both self and bodily awareness because they are futural possibilities 
informing how we will move (Welton), or imperceptible and only available to marginal awareness 
in relation to other intentional acts (Gallagher). If this is the case, then what can be apprehended 
or known about bodily-schemata?  
For Sartre the body is everywhere, and so are the senses; and “yet everywhere” they are 
inapprehensible” (Sartre [1943] 1958, 416). The body can be found extended across the tools that 
it utilises:  
[i]t is at the end of the cane on which I lean against the earth; it is at the end of the 
telescope which shows me the stars; it is on the chair, in the whole house; for it is 
my adaption to these tools. (Sartre [1943] 1958, 428) 
If we accept that the body and its perceiving senses are extended across objects and materials that 
we use or wear, is it possible to sidestep the problems of constituting our body based on dubious 
claims of inner bodily-awareness, or our inapprehension of bodily-schemata? Rather than cast 
these aspects into unintelligible, unknowable realms termed the ‘preconscious’ or ‘prenoetic’, is it 
not possible to apprehend them, if only partially, through the objects and materials that extend 
them?  
There are two implied presuppositions if we develop this view: the first is to accept that the body 
and its senses are transcendent objects amongst others in the world. The second implies if we are 
apprehending the body’s depth structure in relation to an object, then we are focused upon a site 
of reciprocal interaction, rather than the body for-itself. In the next section, I will consider such 
external sites of interaction where the body’s movements are extended beyond the body and 
boundary of skin as observable objects. 
3 Bodily-schemata extended and supra-extended through objects and materials 
In the 1920s, neurologist Henry Head observed that a ‘body-schema can extend to the feather in a 
woman’s hat’.11 This often-used observation in embodied cognition theory supports the view that 
the deeper organisational structures of proprioception are visibly apprehended beyond the 
boundary of the skin. My own experience of women walking the streets with feathers in their hats 
follows a day at the races in Randwick, the site of one of Sydney’s racecourses. By early evening, 
the streets of nearby Paddington crawl with inebriated women donning (ironically like proud 
peacocks) an array of fascinators eagerly attempting to fascinate. Feathers bob, jiggle, swish and 
sway upon stiletto points. One need only watch the feather to ascertain how well the underlying 
structures of bodily movement are doing after many pops of champagne. My point here is that we 
can observe the way other bodies move at a deeper structural level by paying attention to the site 
of interaction where the feather and moving body meet. Arguably such external observations can 
produce a more nuanced account of a dynamically moving body through acute attention towards 
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micro-shifts in orientation and weight, motion and rest, micro-movements and adjustments of 
balance—to name only a few. Granting the subtlety of a feather’s motion, and other external 
causes that move the feather (say for instance, a breeze), make the observation somewhat causally 
convoluted. We can take this example as a clue for apprehending bodily-schemata in less subtle 
extensions of the body within performance, especially when the performer is able to engage in 
reflective practices. 
Despite the current philosophical consensus that reflective awareness of bodily-schemata is 
impossible as noted above, I would argue that we can begin to observe these deeper structures by 
looking toward the body externalised through a process of Sartrean transcendence. Rather than 
looking inward, it becomes a case of looking outward toward instances of externally constituted 
movement. To some extent this perspective is developed by Finkelstein in his work on self-
knowledge where he, through Wittgenstein, considers the correlation of three different first-
person authority statements expressing a single mental state. He identifies three examples: (1) 
“when we speak directly about our state of mind”; (2) “when we speak about what is expressed by 
our behaviour; and (3) when we merely ascribe mental states to ourselves in thoughts” (Finkelstein 
2003, 112). For Finkelstein, these three statements all bear an equal relation as language 
expressions to the same mental state they describe. On this account, my internal sensing of 
movement is no more an authority on bodily awareness, than external expressions of this 
movement described directly or through my thoughts. 
The feather example is from the perspective of an external observer and so does not directly 
overcome the problem of bodily awareness for the performer—or for the drunken ladies trying to 
fascinate a mate. If we are to step into the performer’s shoes to apprehend one’s own bodily 
schemata, the field of interactive digital performance could function as one means amongst others 
to provide the performer with external information about his/her deeper bodily structures through 
external sites of interaction.12 Interestingly, the return to the external apprehension of movement 
presents a reversal of concerns held by dance makers involved in experiential dance decades 
before contemporary work in dance technology events. These traditions can be traced back to 
what Sally Banes identifies as the postmodern period of dance in the United States, especially with 
the first generation of Judson Church Dance Theatre artists on the East Coast, and the teachings of 
Anna Halprin on the West (Banes 1994). Britain was also a stronghold for experiential dance 
practices emerging in the 1970s, forming what “has come to be called new dance”. According to 
Emilyn Claid, British new dance ‘interrogates, reappraises, deconstructs and reconstructs codified 
techniques’ through the practices of “body-mind centering, Aikido, Alexander technique and 
release-based knowledges” (Claid 2006, 80). The reversal of the dancer’s perceptual attention from 
the external to the internal was a revolutionary process of “letting go of the mirror”. With codified 
classical and modern dance, 
[d]ancers learn each technique by embodying the external representation of the 
performed language. These are the mirror-reflected languages, working from the 
external images to the internal kinaesthetic. In contrast, body-mind techniques 
focus on the internal anatomy of the body where there is no externally constructed 
performance as such. (Claid 2006, 80) 
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The mirror-reflected languages of classical and modern dance forms that were ‘let go’ by British 
new dance and postmodern styles arguably engage with Sartrean transcendence, in that, an 
awareness of movement is accessed by viewing the external image, and consciousness of this 
movement is constituted outside of the body. Like these mirror-reflected modes of moving, the 
use of interactive technologies in art and performance supra-extend the body in the form of 
projected images thrown on a range of surfaces, including the flesh of the moving performer. They 
offer a contemporaneous response to the ‘classic-modern’ versus ‘new dance-postmodern’ debate 
regarding external and internal awarenesses. Traditional technologies like lighting supra-extend 
the body at different scales in relation to the corporeal body in a play of moving shadows 
and/silhouettes. The performer can visibly watch their projected self in real-time, or as a temporally 
manipulated image in playback. In more emergent tracking technologies the movements of the 
dancer and image are co-created. Both are constrained by the other in their spatial relations (the 
dancer usually needing to work within a defined space to be recorded and/or mapped), but these 
constraints offer a myriad of possible movements as visual and/or sonic outputs.  
In my experiences of working with choreographer Carol Brown and programmer Mette Ramsgard 
Thomsen in a workshop based instantiation of their work Sea, Unsea (2009), my movements 
recorded by an infrared camera were drawn in realtime as abstract visual representations by 
virtual agents within specifically designed software. Dressed all in black, except for hands, feet and 
face, these agents were attracted to my exposed flesh in a live recorded image, drawing the 
pathway of my movements as a constant line dynamically folding and unfolding in geometric, 
origami like patterns. What was interesting in this experience in the first instance was the 
reorientation of reflective awareness away from the sole concern of ‘how I had moved’, ‘how I was 
moving’, and ‘how I might move’. Even though the image projected was not a direct reflection of 
my form in any detail, I was aware that my movement choice was mutually affected and 
responsible for the way in which the pattern was drawn, and the causal relation between my 
moving and the drawn representation became ambiguous. I was not familiar with the system, so 
became apprehensive about ignoring audience in order to watch the screen and retain my 
connection with the moving lines. There was no set choreography, so I rehearsed a triangulated, 
separated awareness between moving, the projections changing and my prospective audience.  
Secondly, my orientation, levels, speed, and limb relations produced a different visual 
representation, which I noticed on screen without any prior planning of my limbs. I observed visual 
forms supraextending my moving body on screen. Even though these representations were 
abstract in form, I could reflect on major limb relations and the logic of my moving without recourse 
to internal sensation. My experience of this interactive system is a leading clue to how limits to an 
awareness of bodily-schemata might be overcome through paying attention to external visual 
representations of the body supraextended by digital technologies. Further research of more 
sensitive interactive systems would strengthen these insights, both as a performer and audience 
member. In particular, such research might examine systems that create a more fluid and time-
sensitive graphic that not only tracks points, limbs or colours of the body, but moves with relative 
force, dimension, weight and texture as a precise articulation of the interaction point between the 
three-dimensional moving body and two-dimensional graphic.  
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To conclude 
A performer does not need an apodictic internal awareness of the body to affirm their experience 
of bodily-schemata. Inner bodily awareness is not the authoritative expression of our bodily states. 
Counter-intuitively, these deeper, hidden structures of bodily-schemata can be apprehended as 
external, transcendent expressions. In The Transcendence of the Ego, Sartre reflects cursorily on the 
body by paying attention to egoic acts. He somewhat evades the body in his quest to separate the 
ego from consciousness, and to ontologically describe the body as being for others. And yet, as I 
have argued here, if our internal reflections constituting body meet their limits with bodily-
schemata, Sartre’s thesis of transcendence provides a different kind of access to understanding 
bodily constitution without forcing an imagined unity between body and consciousness and 
affirming more than we can know, for here we are required to look outward, rather than inward, 
to gain a better insight into these prefiguring bodily structures of movement.  
For dance practices that ‘let go’ of externally constituted modes of apprehending movement to 
ascertain some pre/non-reflective internal awareness, the ideas presented in this article—through 
the philosophy of Sartre and the experiential insights gained from dancing within an interactive 
digital system—not only challenge the voracity of their claims, but present a more 
contemporaneous reversal of the internal over the external through performance technologies 
along with access to the very depth structures that somatic-led practices seek.  
 
 
1 Authentic movement evolved in the 1950s from the work of Mary Whitehouse who attempted to develop “a 
body/mind integrative approach to personality” in psychological therapy. Successors of Whitehouse’s approach to 
mind, body, movement and imagination include Joan Chodorow, a Jungian analyst and dance therapist who 
brought together authentic movement and depth psychology, and Janet Adler a dance movement therapist who 
“codified the discipline of authentic movement” and approached it more as a healing practice (Tantia 2012, 57).     
2 Attention is directed at a body both visually and sensuously imagined. This is different to attending directly to 
something seen or even felt. 
3 One does not need to look far into the literature on somatic dance practices to understand that reflection is a 
key mental strategy for a dancer or practitioner to gain an experiential awareness of their bodily sensations and 
movements. See especially Martha Eddy’s historical survey of the somatic tradition from the late 19th century to 
current contemporary practice for examples of approaches to reflection. Eddy likens the tradition to “a field of 
wild flowers with unique species randomly popping up across wide expanses” (2009, 6). See also Stromsted (2007) 
and Batson and Wilson (2014).  
4 My use of the prefix ‘supra’ as opposed to ‘super’ is to describe precisely that which extends beyond the limits of 
a thing, or is outside of it. 
5 I will capitalise Sartre’s concept of Ego to distinguish it from other conceptions.  
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Westernising, reconstructive post World War Japan. It is described as more than a performing art in its close links 
with social change and “an evolution in ways of thinking” (Alishina 2015, 12-13). While butoh may be identified by 
a range of differing characteristics (12), Sondra Fraleigh (2010) describes it in terms of its imagistic practice:     
(Yoko) Ashikawa [one of the female founders of butoh] taught that butoh grows out of felt imagery, and 
that internalizing the idea or image is the difficult part, because you must get rid of the conscious effort 
of visualizing before you can internalize. She added that the audience for butoh might not receive the 
exact image the dancer internalizes, but they cannot mistake the imaginistic [sic] process. The process 
for imaging for both the dancer and the audience is the aesthetic core of butoh. ‘“Butoh accepts that 
fiction is another kind of reality,” she said, “Should you be able to really visualize an enormous eye looking 
at you from behind?” she asked. The answer is basically “Yes”’ (199, 142). 
7 Authentic movement is described by the Authentic Movement Community “as a meditative, spiritual practice that 
integrates body and mind for increased access to consciousness” and “as part of psychotherapy process, for 
enhanced sense of self and well-being; often bringing unconscious thoughts to awareness” (Authentic Movement 
Community 2016).  
8 Following the body’s exclusion from the activities of the epoché in Ideas I, as a transcendency of the natural world 
(Husserl [1913] 1998) Husserl reinstates the body in his arguments for bodily constitution and self-awareness in 
the reconstitution of material nature in Ideas II, making a fundamental distinction between the lived-body (Leib) 
and the physical body (Körper). Bodily self-awareness is made possible through the lived experiences (Erlebnis) of 
our sensings within the occurrence of touch. Sensings are prior to any objectification of the body constituted as 
mine but may be reflected upon through directed phenomenological reflection towards these instances of touch: 
a body in perpetual contact with its world (Husserl [1928] 1989). Phenomenologists since Husserl continue to use 
this distinction, keeping with Leib, rather than Köorper in their phenomenological investigations. Sartre is one 
exception, however, in his objectification of body as a body being-for-others.  
So far as the physicians have had any experience with my body, it was with my body in the midst of the 
world and as it is for others. My body as it is for me does not appear to me in the midst of the world. Of 
course during a radioscopy I was able to see the picture of my vertebrae on a screen, but I was outside 
in the midst of the world. I was apprehending a wholly constituted object as a this among other thises, 
and it was only by a reasoning process that I referred it back to being mine; it was much more my property 
than my being (Sartre [1943] 1958, 303-304).  
9 For a classical view of inner perception in psychology, whereby inner perception is not seen as an act or activity, 
but a secondary consciousness that is always present within mental activity, see Brentano (1973); for accounts in 
cognitive science see Hurlburt and Heavey (2001); and in philosophy of mind see Cassam (1994) for classic and 
contemporary debates on self-knowledge, and Burwood, Gilbert and Lennon (2005) for a more general discussion 
on inner perception in this tradition.   
10  The prenoetic performance of the body involves those habitual postures and movements that are not 
conceptualised, visualised or emoted (as is the case with body-image). The prenoetic is where the body “acquires 
a certain organisation or style in its relation with its environment”, but which is not readily brought to 
consciousness and includes the non-conscious aspects of proprioceptive activity (Gallagher 2005, 32). Prenoetic 
movements help to structure consciousness and the perceptual field within which they are entwined. 
11 Reference found in Gallagher (2005, 32) and also in Arbib (2003, 994): “a woman’s power of localization may 
extend to the feather of her hat”. 
12 If feathers or costume are material extensions of the human body, technological extensions (i.e. projections, 
shadows, amplified sounds) present supra-extended embodiments, a describable feature of experiences for 




96 PERFORMANCE PHILOSOPHY VOL 2 (1)  (2016) 
 
[i]n digital practices, instrumentation is mutually implicated with the body in an epistemological 
sense.The body adapts and extends itself through external instruments. To have experience, to get used 
to an instrument, is to incorporate that instrument into the body. The experience of the corporeal 
schema is not fixed or delimited but extendable to the various tools and technologies which may be 
embodied. (Broadhurst 2009, 9) 
Don Ihde goes further: 
[i]f I am right about the secret norm of a here-body in action, it should also be noted that such a body 
experience is one that is not simply coextensive with a body outline or one’s skin […]. One’s “skin” is at 
best polymorphically ambiguous, and, even without material extension, the sense of the here-body 
exceeds its physical bounds. (Ihde 2002, 6) 
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